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A SIMPLE DYNAMICAL MODEL LEADING TO PARETO
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND STABILITY
RICARDO PE´REZ MARCO
Abstract. We propose a simple dynamical model of wealth evolution. The invari-
ant distributions are of Pareto type and are dynamically stable as conjectured by
Pareto.
1. Introduction.
At the end of the XIXth century, in his studies of wealth and income 1 distribution
on different countries, Vilfredo Pareto ([7], [8]) discovered the universal power law that
governs the upper tail of wealth distribution. It is well known that this is not a good
model for the lower part of the curve that is more dependent on specific sociological
factors and of log-normal type (see the discusion in [6]). The exponent in the power
decay is country dependent and is an indicator of equitative wealth (re)distribution.
A larger exponent indicates a more equitative wealth distribution. Pareto’s universal
assymptotic behaviour appears in distributions from various other contexts, and, as
we show, is typical from competitive system where the reward is proportional to the
accumulated wealth. The purpose of this article is to provide a simple explanation to
Pareto’s empirical observation. We propose a natural dynamical model of evolution
of wealth where Pareto distributions emerge as invariant dynamically stable 2 distri-
butions of this Dynamical System. The stability of the wealth distribution, which is
different from the universality property, was conjectured by Pareto, whose intuition
apparently comes from his empirical observations. We can read in [8], chap. VII,
point 31, p.393:
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1Wealth and income are proxies of each other in first approximation for our purposes.
2“Dynamically stable distribution” in the Dynamical System sense not in the probabilistic sense.
1
2 R. PE´REZ MARCO
Si, par exemple, on enlevait tout leur revenu aux citoyens les plus riches, en sup-
primant la queue de la figure des revenus, celle-ci ne conserverait pas cette forme,
mais toˆt ou tard elle se re´tablirait suivant une forme semblable a` la premie`re.3
There are other classical models and studies of Pareto empirical observation and
power laws (like Zipf’s law). For the record we cite a few classical ones: H. Simon
[11], D.G. Champernowne [2], B. Mandelbrot [6],etc Simon model [11] for Zipf’s law
is a “genesis model” of the distribution, i.e. it is a model for its creation. Champer-
nowne [2] proposed a general multiplicative stochastic model, and B. Mandelbrot [6]
explained Pareto law by the universal limit character of Pareto-Le´vy probabilistically
stable distributions.
2. The dynamical model.
In this first section, we propose and study a dynamical model of wealth evolution
which is a simple first approximation.
1. Setup. Let f(x) be the wealth distribution, i.e. df = f(x) dx is the number
of individuals with wealth in the infinitesimal interval [x, x + dx[. The distribution
function f : R+ → R+ is continuous, positive and decreasing and limx→+∞ f(x) = 0.
A distribution is of Pareto type if it presents a power law decay x−α at +∞, that is
lim
x→+∞
− log f(x)
log x
= α > 0 .
The exponent α > 0 is Pareto exponent. A distribution of the form f(x) = C.x−α is
called a Pareto distribution. Smaller values of α indicate larger inequalities in wealth
distribution. Notice that α > 1 is necessary for the distribution to be summable at
+∞, i.e. finite wealth at infinite (finitness near 0 is not significant since the model
aims to explain the tail behaviour at +∞).
2. Wealth dynamics. We focuss on the evolution of individual wealth. We assume
that the evolution is based on two main factors: Finantial decisions, that we model
as a betting game, and by public redistribution of wealth, that absorbs part of the
individual wealth into public wealth.
For the first factor we model the finantial decisions of each individual by a sequence
of bets. Each financial decision turns out to be a bet, waging a proportion of his
wealth. As a first approximation, we assume that the probability of success is the
same for all agents and bets 0 < p < 1 (this is the average probability). At each
3“If, for instance, we confiscate all income to the richests citizens, thus erasing the tail of income
distribution, this shape will not persist and sooner or later it will evolve to a similar shape of the
original.”
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round, each agent risks the same percentage of his wealth, a fraction γ > 0 (that is
also an average). If he wins, his wealth is multiplied by the factor 1 + γ and if he
looses his wealth is divided by 1 + γ.
Only considering this first factor, one round evolution the distribution transforms
into the new distribution
W(f)(x) = p
1 + γ
f(x/(1 + γ)) + (1− p)(1 + γ) f((1 + γ)x) .
The operator W is “wealth preserving”. In terms of L1-norm we have
||W(f)||L1 = ||f ||L1 .
The agents will only risk their capital if there is a positive expectation of gain, thus
we should assume that p > 1/2.
There are other mechanisms that affect wealth evolution that we should consider,
as for example inheritances that divide wealth, taxes, etc. Note that public wealth
drains individual wealth by the fiscal mechanism. Thus it is natural to consider a
broader class of operators W with a dissipative parameter κ ≥ 1, the dissipative
coefficient,
Wκ(f)(x) = 1
κ
W(f)(x) = p
κ(1 + γ)
f (x/(1 + γ)) +
(1− p)(1 + γ)
κ
f((1 + γ)x) ,
so that for κ = 1 the operator is wealth preserving. We name the model for κ = 1
the “wealth preserving model”.
3. Invariant distributions. Distributions invariant by the evolution operator Wκ
must satisfy the fixed point functional equation Wκ(f) = f , that is,
(1) f(x) =
p
κ(1 + γ)
f (x/(1 + γ)) +
(1− p)(1 + γ)
κ
f((1 + γ)x) .
We solve this equation in the next section.
4. Solution of the functional equation. Considering the change of variables
F (x) = f(ex), equation (1) becomes a functional equation for F : R→ R
(2) a F (x+ λ)− F (x) + b F (x− λ) = 0 ,
where λ = log(1 + γ) > 0, a = (1− p)(1 + γ)/κ > 0 and b = p/κ/(1 + γ) > 0.
We have a general theory of these type of functional equations. L. Schwartz (see
[10], and also [5], [3]) studied more general “mean periodic” smooth functions F that
satisfy a functional equation of the form
ω ⋆ F = 0 ,
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where ω is a compactly supported distribution. In our case, ω = a δλ − δ0 + b δ−λ4.
In our simplified model we don’t need the general theory and the equation can be
solved by elementary means. First, the exponential solutions are easy to calculate. A
function F (x) = eρx is a solution if eρλ satisfies the following second degree equation:
(3) a
(
eρλ
)2 − (eρλ)+ b = 0 .
Observe that the discriminant ∆ = 1− 4ab is positive since we have
ab =
p(p− 1)
κ2
<
1
4κ2
,
thus ∆ > 1− 1
κ2
> 0 because κ ≥ 1.
Thus we have two distinct solutions:
eρλ =
1
2a
± 1
2a
√
1− 4ab .
Since a > 0 and the polynomial P (x) = ax2−x+b satisfies P (0) > 0 and P (1) < 0,
we have two real root x1 and x2 with 0 < x1 < 1 < x2. Therefore, we have two families
of solutions for ρ in two vertical lines in the complex domain, for k ∈ Z, j = 0, 1,
ρj,k = λ
−1 log xj + 2πikλ
−1 .
Note that ℜρ0,k < 0 < ℜρ1,k. Let ρ0 = ρ0,0 < 0 and ρ1 = ρ1,0 > 0. Observe that
the particular solution F (x) = C.eρ0x leads to the solution f(x) = F (log x) = C.xρ0
which is exactly Pareto distribution with Pareto exponent α = −ρ0.
We can now solve the functional equation completely5:
Theorem 1. The general solution of the functional equation (2),
(4) a F (x+ λ)− F (x) + b F (x− λ) = 0 ,
(with a, b, λ as above) is
F (x) = eρ0xL0(x/λ) + e
ρ1xL1(x/λ)
where L0 and L1 are Z-periodic functions.
4The way to study these equations is by Fourier transforming it (a` la Carleman [1] using hyper-
functions in order to work in sufficient generality). One of the general results by L. Schwartz (see
[10] Theorem 10 p.894) is the “spectral synthesis” of solutions: Smooth solutions are uniform limits
on compact set of R of linear combinations of exponential solutions (eρx)ρ. Also these exponential
solutions are not limits of linear combinations of the others, thus the expansion is unique.
5We have a strong form of Schwartz spectral theorem.
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In order to solve the functional equation (2), we consider H(x) = F (x + λ) −
eρ0λF (x). Substracting (2) from (3) multiplied by e−ρ0λF (x) we get
aH(x)− be−ρ0λH(x− λ) = 0 ,
or
H(x) =
(
b
a
e−ρ0λ
)
H(x− λ) .
Considering
Hˆ(x) =
(
b
a
e−ρ0λ
)
−x/λ
H(x) ,
we have that Hˆ(x) = Hˆ(x− λ), i.e. there is a Z-periodic function L such that
H(x) =
(
b
a
e−ρ0λ
)x/λ
L(x/λ) .
Therefore we have
F (x+ λ)− eρ0λF (x) =
(
b
a
e−ρ0λ
)x/λ
L(x/λ) .
Now, put
Fˆ (x) = e−ρ0xF (x) .
Then we need to solve
Fˆ (x+ λ)− Fˆ (x) = e−ρ0λ
(
b
a
)x/λ
e−2ρ0xL(x/λ) ,
if we write G(x) = eρ0λFˆ (x) and c = −2ρ0 + λ−1 log(b/a),
G(x+ λ)−G(x) = ecxL(x/λ) .
We use the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For c ∈ R, λ > 0, and L a Z-periodic function, the solutions of the
functional equation
(5) G(x+ λ)−G(x) = ecxL(x/λ) ,
are of the form
G(x) = G0(x) +M(x/λ) ,
where M is a Z-periodic function, and for c 6= 0,
G0(x) =
ecx
ecλ − 1 L(x/λ) ,
and for c = 0
G0(x) = λ
−1x L(x/λ) .
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Proof. Obviously in both cases G0 is a particular solution. Then the functional equa-
tion is equivalent to M(x + 1) −M(x) = 0, where M(x) = G(λx)− G0(λx), i.e. M
is Z-periodic. 
So, in the non-degenerate case (c 6= 0), absorbing the multiplicative constants into
L and M , the general solutions of (2) are of the form
F (x) = e(−ρ0+λ
−1 log(b/a))xL(x/λ) + eρ0xM(x/λ) .
And coming back to the second degree equation (3) we have
e−ρ0λ
b
a
= eρ1λ ,
so
F (x) = eρ1xL(x/λ) + eρ0xM(x/λ) .
Indeed the degenerate case never happens:
Lemma 3. We have c 6= 0.
Proof. If c = 0 then e2ρ0λ = b/a = eρ0λ.eρ1λ and eρ0λ = eρ1λ, the root of the second
degree equation would be double and the discriminant would be ∆ = 0 but we have
seen that ∆ > 0. 
If we request that F > 0 and F (x) → 0 for x → +∞ (the only sound solutions)
then L = 0 and M > 0,
F (x) = eρ0xM(x/λ) .
Finally we have
f(x) = xρ0M(λ−1 log x) .
If we look for continuous solutions, then M must be continuous and bounded since it
is Z-periodic, thus f satisfies Pareto assymptotics
lim
x→+∞
− log f(x)
log x
= −ρ0 = α > 0 .
5. Pareto exponent. It is interesting that we can compute an explicit expression
of the Pareto exponent in terms of the parameters κ, γ and p,
Corollary 4. The Pareto exponent is given by
α = −ρ0 = −λ−1 log
(
1−√1− 4ab
2a
)
or
α = 1−
log
(
κ−
√
κ2−4p(1−p)
2(1−p)
)
log(1 + γ)
.
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It is interesting to note that the Pareto exponent α decreases when γ increases.
This means that a more risky finantial behaviour, or more active economy, favours
unequal distribution. Fortunes are created and lost more often. Ruin is more common.
Indeed we know by the Kelly criterion [4] that ruin is almost sure in the long run if
γ is larger than a certain threshold. With a slightly modified model we can explain
Pareto’s theory of “Circulation of Elites”. Indeed this circulation occurs at all level of
social status when the agents are not enough conservative to satisfy Kelly criterion.
We will discuss these questions in a companion article [9].
The Pareto exponent also increases with κ since
dα
dκ
=
1
log(1 + γ)
κ−√κ2 − 4p(1− p)√
κ2 − 4p(1− p)
(
κ−√κ2 − 4p(1− p)) ,
is positive. This is natural since a larger κ means a larger demographic and fiscal
pressure and thus we expect a better redistribution of wealth and a larger Pareto
exponent.
6. A remarkable solution in the wealth preserving model. A Pareto exponent
α > 1 is necessary for summability of the tail of the distribution and is always observed
in experimental studies. It is remarkable that in the wealth preserving model with
the critical value of the dissipative coefficient κ = 1, the Pareto exponent is exactly
α = 1.
Theorem 5. In the wealth preserving model, κ = 1, the Pareto exponent is exactly
equal to α = 1.
Proof. For κ = 1 we have
κ2 − 4p(1− p) = (2p− 1)2 .
Therefore
κ−
√
κ2 − 4p(1− p) = 2(1− p) .
And the formula in the previous section gives α = 1. 
This result is natural and to be expected: For κ < 1 the wealth in increasing
without limit and the invariant distributions could not be summable at +∞, and for
κ > 1 we have finite wealth at +∞. From the form of the invariant solutions, we
have:
Theorem 6. For an invariant solution, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) The tail wealth is summable, W (f, x0) < +∞ .
(2) The Pareto exponent α is larger than 1, α > 1.
(3) The model is wealth dissipative, that is κ > κ0 .
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It has been observed that the Pareto exponent of the wealthiest fraction of the
population has a Pareto exponent which is much closer to 1 than expected (or to the
rest of the medium class, whatever this means). So for this class of the population the
dissipative coefficient is closer to the critical one κ0, this means that the wealthiest
part of the population is able to avoid the mechanisms of fiscal redistribution of
wealth.
7. Stability of invariant solutions. We now study the Pareto problem of stability
of the Pareto distribution.
Since κ > 1, we can observe that for the L1-norm the operator Wκ is contracting:
Lemma 7. Let f, g : R∗+ → R+ be measurable functions , with f − g ∈ L1(R∗+), then
||Wκ(f)−Wκ(g)||L1 ≤ κ−1||f − g||L1 .
Proof. We have
|Wκ(f)(x)−Wκ(g)(x)| ≤ p
κ(1 + γ)
|f(x/(1 + γ))− g(x/(1 + γ))|
+
(1− p)(1 + γ)
κ
|f(x(1 + γ))− g(x(1 + γ))|
and the result follows integrating over R∗+. 
Obviously this lemma is only interesting when ||f−g||L1 is finite. For each invariant
solution f0 it is natural to consider the space of measurable bounded perturbations
of f0 for the L
1-norm,M(R∗+,R) denotes the space of Borel measurable functions,
Sf0 = {g ∈ M(R∗+,R); ||g − f0||L1 < +∞} .
Then the fixed point f0 is a global attractor in Sf0 and we have:
Theorem 8. For any g ∈ Sf0, we have that Wnκ (g) → f0 for the L1-norm at a
geometric rate.
This proves the Pareto stability conjecture, exactly as stated by Pareto (see the
citation in the introduction): If we remove all wealth larger than some value x from
the invariant solution, then the perturbation thus obtained is L1 bounded because of
summability of the tail, hence the stability.
3. Other more refined models.
With the same ideas, we can build more sophisticated models that will be studied
in the future. The main difference with the model presented here is that the invariant
solutions cannot be computed explicitely in general, nor we can give close formulas
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for the Pareto exponents. But this does not prevent numerical studies of the invariant
solutions.
We may more realistically assume that there are different sorts of individuals with
different skills for finantial investment (different p’s), and different risk profiles (dif-
ferent γ’s). If we assume that each class of individuals is equally represented accross
wealth classes (which is not true, the more skilled ones should be more numerous in
the upper classes), then we end with a general wealth operator of the form
Wκ(f) =
∑
i
pi(1 + γi)
κ
f(x/(1 + γi)) +
qi(1 + γi)
κ
f(x(1 + γi)) ,
with ∑
i
pi +
∑
i
qi = 1 .
The exponentials of the Pareto exponents appear then as roots of a Dirichlet polyno-
mial. One can prove, using results from [10] that the invariant solutions obey Pareto
law.
A more realistic model consists in allowing the dissipative coefficient κ to be non
constant and make it dependent on x. In principle, x 7→ κ(x) should be increas-
ing. Then the search for invariant solutions leads to a functional equation with
non-constant coefficients whose possible explicit resolution depends on the form of
the function x 7→ κ(x).
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